Thick Perceptual Content in Aristotle’s Philosophy

It appears that the perceptual content is, for Aristotle, thick, viz. it is not only rudimentary individual objects (unlike Plato in Theatetus), but also propositions and universals. By “perceptual content” I mean what is directly perceived. The fact of the matter is that we take propositions, dispositions, relations and universals to be the direct objects of various kinds of perceptions in our ordinary language; consider for instance (all examples are of the visual perception for convenience): (a) “I see the sharpness of the knife” (sharpness is a disposition), (b) “I see that John is going” (that John is going is a proposition), (c) “I see that the flood is destroying that little hut” (flood’s destroying the little hut is a causal relation), (d) “I see a man in you” (man is a universal). But some philosophers may not take these ordinary statements seriously and try to translate them into more deflationist statements such as: (a*) “I see the edge of the knife which has the disposition to cut”, (b*) “I see John in different places in continuous points of time”, (c*) “I see the flood and right after it, I see the destruction of the hut”, (d*) “I see an individual person (you) and I know by other non-perceptual means that you are a man-token”. Such deflationist strategy suggests a thin view of the perceptual contents, but inflationists hold a thick view of the perceptual contents, taking the ordinary expressions of perceiving the above phenomena literary.
I think Plato and Aristotle have opposing views on this issue, with the former maintaining a deflationist and the latter holding an inflationist view of perceptual experiences. They both have epistemological concerns for their respective views.

A draft of this idea is available here. Comments welcome.